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Essay 
SLUDGE AND ORDEALS 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN† 
ABSTRACT 
  Is there an argument for behaviorally informed deregulation? In 
2015, the United States government imposed 9.78 billion hours of 
paperwork burdens on the American people. Many of these hours are 
best categorized as “sludge,” understood as friction, reducing access to 
important licenses, programs, and benefits. Because of the sheer costs 
of sludge, rational people are effectively denied life-changing goods 
and services. The problem is compounded by the existence of 
behavioral biases, including inertia, present bias, and unrealistic 
optimism. A serious deregulatory effort should be undertaken to 
reduce sludge through automatic enrollment, greatly simplified forms, 
and reminders. At the same time, sludge can promote legitimate goals. 
First, it can protect program integrity, which means that policymakers 
might have to make difficult tradeoffs between (1) granting benefits to 
people who are not entitled to them and (2) denying benefits to people 
who are entitled to them. Second, it can overcome impulsivity, 
recklessness, and self-control problems. Third, it can prevent intrusions 
on privacy. Fourth, it can serve as a rationing device, ensuring that 
benefits go to people who most need them. Fifth, it can help public 
officials to acquire valuable information, which they can use for 
important purposes. In most cases, however, these defenses of sludge 
turn out to be far more attractive in principle than in practice. For 
sludge, a form of cost-benefit analysis is essential, and it will often 
demonstrate the need for a neglected form of deregulation: sludge 
reduction. For both public and private institutions, “Sludge Audits” 
should become routine, and they should provide a foundation for 
behaviorally informed deregulation. Various suggestions are offered 
for new action by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 
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which oversees the Paperwork Reduction Act; for courts; and for 
Congress. 
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I.  9.78 BILLION HOURS 
Enacted in 1979, the Paperwork Reduction Act (“PRA”)1 was 
meant to be a deregulatory statute. It was designed to minimize the 
paperwork burden imposed on the American people and to maximize 
the benefit of the information obtained. Its key provision states: 
 
With respect to the collection of information and the control of 
paperwork, the Director [of the Office of Management and Budget] 
shall—  
  (1) review and approve proposed agency collections of  
information 
  (2) coordinate the review of the collection of information  
associated with Federal procurement and acquisition by the  
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs with the Office of  
 
 1.  Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163 (codified as amended 
at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521 (2012)). 
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Federal Procurement Policy, with particular emphasis on applying  
information technology to improve the efficiency and  
effectiveness of Federal procurement, acquisition and payment,  
and to reduce information collection burdens on the public; 
  (3) minimize the Federal information collection burden,  
with particular emphasis on those individuals and entities most  
adversely affected; 
  (4) maximize the practical utility of and public benefit  
from information collected by or for the Federal Government; and 
  (5) establish and oversee standards and guidelines by  
which agencies are to estimate the burden to comply with a  
proposed collection of information.2 
 
For present purposes, the most important provisions are (3) and 
(4). The word “minimize” suggests that paperwork burdens should be 
no greater than necessary to promote the agency’s goals. The central 
idea seems to be one of cost-effectiveness: as between two approaches 
to promoting those goals, the least burdensome must be chosen.3 
Taking the word “minimize” together with the phrase “maximize the 
practical utility and public benefit,” we can plausibly understand the 
PRA to suggest a kind of cost-benefit test as well: the costs of 
paperwork burdens must justify their benefits. And yet there is no 
systematic effort, to date, to see which burdens pass that test. Nor is 
there an opportunity for judicial review of arbitrary or capricious 
collection of information. If an agency is imposing highly burdensome 
information collection without good reason, courts appear to be 
unavailable, notwithstanding the general rule in favor of review for 
arbitrariness. 
All this creates serious problems. The idea of “deregulation” is 
usually taken to refer to elimination or reduction of the kinds of 
burdens imposed through notice-and-comment rulemaking, as with 
repeal of rules on the books.4 Elimination or reduction of paperwork 
 
 2.  44 U.S.C. § 3504(c) (emphasis added). 
 3.  For discussion of some of the complexities with this concept, see COST-EFFECTIVENESS 
IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE (Marthe R. Gold, Louise B. Russell, Joanna E. Siegel & Milton C. 
Weinstein eds., 1996). 
 4.  See PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ELECTRICAL UTILITY DEREGULATION 211 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation 
and the Hard Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177, 203–04 (noting that “deregulation involves 
an inquiry into a well-defined, actual [agency] decision,” with an emphasis on repeal of 
regulations). 
SUNSTEIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2019  3:59 PM 
1846  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1843 
is not generally understood as deregulation.5 But in view of its costs, 
material and otherwise, paperwork reduction should be considered a 
high priority.  
Over the last decades, the United States has experienced a cost-
benefit revolution, in which the benefits of regulations are generally 
required to justify their costs.6 To a significant extent, the revolution 
has bypassed paperwork burdens. This is a major omission. Whenever 
the government imposes such burdens, it should ask the cost-benefit 
question. Crucially, it should ask distributional questions as well. Who 
is helped by paperwork burdens? Who is hurt? The disabled? The 
poor? The elderly? By how much? As we shall see, the most plausible 
answers are instructive.  
There is an additional point. In recent years, behavioral science 
has played a significant role in thinking about regulation, leading not 
merely to academic pleas for behaviorally informed initiatives of 
various kinds but also to actual initiatives in multiple domains, often 
producing large benefits at low cost.7 But if we put a spotlight on 
sludge, we will be interested in something different and insufficiently 
explored: behaviorally informed deregulation.8 To be sure, fully 
rational people, unaffected by behavioral biases, might be, and are, 
adversely affected by sludge. As we shall see, however, behavioral 
biases of various sorts make sludge especially harmful and sometimes 
devastating.  
 
 5.  For an example of efforts to deregulate in this way, see Memorandum from Cass R. 
Sunstein, Admin., OIRA, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies, and Indep. Reg. 
Commissions (Aug. 9, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/ 
omb/inforeg/memos/testing-and-simplifying-federal-forms.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9QY-TVUU] 
[hereinafter Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein (Aug. 9, 2012)]; Memorandum from Cass R. 
Sunstein, Admin., OIRA, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (June 22, 2012), 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/oira-reducing-rep-paperwork-burdens-2012.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/FRA5-M5P2] [hereinafter Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein (June 22, 2012)] 
(providing direction to agencies consistent with the PRA and Executive Order 13610, Identifying 
and Reducing Regulatory Burdens).  
 6.  For a description of this revolution, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT 
REVOLUTION (2018) (describing the rise of cost-benefit balancing in government). 
 7.  Examples of such initiatives can be found in DAVID HALPERN, INSIDE THE NUDGE 
UNIT (2015); PETE LUNN, REGULATORY POLICY AND BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS (2014); 
RHYS JONES, JESSICA PYKETT & MARK WHITEHEAD, CHANGING BEHAVIOURS (201); George 
Loewenstein & Nick Chater, Putting Nudges in Perspective, 1 BEHAVIOURAL PUB. POL’Y 26 
(2017); Mark Whitehead, Rhys Jones, Rachel Lilley, Rachel Howell & Jessica Pykett, 
Neuroliberalism: Cognition, Context, and the Geographical Bounding of Rationality, 42 
PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY 325 (2018). 
 8.  In my view, this is a large category that is not limited to sludge, but I am focused only on 
the latter issue here. 
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Even in a highly polarized time, it should be possible to obtain a 
working consensus for many forms of sludge reduction, which can be 
sought and enthusiastically approved by people with diverse political 
convictions. Whatever one’s convictions, one might support sludge 
reduction for small businesses and startups, in the healthcare system, 
in transportation, in education, in occupational licensing, and in many 
other domains. To be sure, political differences might break out in 
some contexts—involving, for example, abortion and divorce—where 
differing moral judgments may lead to radically different evaluations 
of sludge. But in many contexts, sludge reduction ought to have broad 
appeal. And even when disagreements do break out, an improved 
understanding of the importance of sludge, and its concrete effects, can 
help people to understand where they differ, and exactly why. 
The PRA requires the Office of Management and Budget 
(“OMB”) to produce an annual report, called the Information 
Collection Budget of the United States Government (“ICB”).9 The 
ICB quantifies the annual paperwork burden that the U.S. government 
imposes on its citizens. The most recent official report finds that in 
2015, Americans spent 9.78 billion hours on federal paperwork.10 In 
early 2019, an official running count had the number at 11.25 billion 
hours;11 that number is almost certainly more accurate than the 2015 
figure, but because it has not been subject to the same level of internal 
and external scrutiny, I will rely on the 9.78-billion-hour figure here. In 
spite of significant shifts,12 the burden has been high for a long time: 
 
 
 
 9.  44 U.S.C. § 3514(a) (2012).  
 10.  OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, INFORMATION COLLECTION BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT 2 (2016) https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/ 
files/omb/inforeg/inforeg/icb/icb_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FYG-M93W] [hereinafter 
INFORMATION COLLECTION BUDGET 2016]. Puzzlingly, the Trump administration has failed to 
produce the annual report, though it is required by law. See Office of Management and Budget 
Reports, WHITE HOUSE.GOV, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-regulatory-
affairs/reports [https://perma.cc/B75H-FAL3] (listing the 2016 Information Collection Budget as 
the most recent). 
 11.  Government-Wide Totals for Active Information Collections, OIRA, 
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAReport?operation=11 [https://perma.cc/H9K2-J424].  
 12.  The significant drop in fiscal year 2010 was principally the result of reassessments of 
existing burdens rather than an actual drop in burdens. But there was a significant reduction in 
actual burdens from new initiatives, in the vicinity of $386 million. See OFF. OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, INFORMATION COLLECTION BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES Government iv (2011), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/icb/2011_icb.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/DNM2-L85D].  
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It is worth pausing over those 9.78 billion hours. Suppose that we 
assembled every resident of Chicago and insisted that for the entirety 
of 2019, each one must work 40 hours a week engaged in just one task: 
filling out federal forms. By the end of 2019, the 2.7 million citizens of 
Chicago13 will not have come within four billion hours of the annual 
paperwork burden placed on Americans.  
The 9.78 billion hours take a significant toll.14 The Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) has not attempted to 
monetize those hours, though in 2010, it asked for public comments on 
 
 13.  QuickFacts: Chicago City, Illinois, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/chicagocityillinois [https://perma.cc/R7UR-D89B]. 
 14.  Regrettably, the ICB does not make a distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
information collections. It is clear, however, that the vast majority are involuntary. For a clue: the 
Department of Treasury, mostly through the Internal Revenue Service, accounts for over half of 
the total. See INFORMATION COLLECTION BUDGET 2016, supra note 10, at 7 tbl.1 (accounting for 
over 6.9 billion of the 9.4 billion paperwork-burden hours in fiscal year 2014).  
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whether and how to do so.15 If we value an hour of work at $20,16 9.78 
billion hours is the equivalent of $195.6 billion—more than double the 
budget of the Department of State17 and the Department of 
Transportation,18 about triple the budget of the Department of 
Education,19 and about eight times the budget of the Department of 
Energy.20 The monetary figures greatly understate the problem. 
Administrative burdens can make it difficult or impossible for people 
to enjoy fundamental rights (such as the right to vote and the right to 
free speech), to obtain licenses and permits, to obtain life-changing 
benefits, or to avoid crushing hardship.21 With respect to the right to 
 
 15.  See Request for Comments on Implementation of the Paperwork Reduction Act, 74 
Fed. Reg. 55,269 (Oct. 27, 2009). I served as Administrator of OIRA at the time. OMB and OIRA 
asked similar questions in 1999. See Notice of Reevaluation of OMB Guidance on Estimating 
Paperwork Burden, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,788 (Oct. 14, 1999). For a valuable relevant discussion, see 
generally Adam M. Samaha, Death and Paperwork Reduction, 65 DUKE L.J. 279 (2015).  
 16.  The $20 figure is used to simplify the illustration. The federal government does not have 
a standard number, but in Regulatory Impact Analyses it has used numbers from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, which reports an average in the vicinity of $27. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUM. SERV. & FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., TOBACCO PRODUCT STANDARD FOR N-
NITROSONORNICOTINE LEVEL IN FINISHED SMOKELESS TOBACCO PRODUCTS 78 (Jan. 2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/aboutfda/reportsmanualsforms/reports/economicanalyses/ucm5
37872.pdf [https://perma.cc/46HT-25RZ] (“Labor hours are valued at the current market wage as 
reported by the May 2015 Occupational Employment Statistics published by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015).”); Average Hourly and Weekly Earnings of All 
Employees on Private Nonfarm Payrolls by Industry Sector, Seasonally Adjusted, BUREAU OF 
LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t19.htm [https://perma.cc/42WN-8CDG] 
(listing the average hourly wage across private industries in January 2019 as $27.56); see also 
Samaha, supra note 15, at 298 (“Not knowing who would be randomly selected for the survey, the 
[Institute of Museum and Library Services] used the national average per capita income of about 
$20 per hour to convert respondent time into dollar cost.”).  
 17.  DEP’T OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 1 (2018), 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277155.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DM2-EYGR] 
(requesting a budget of $37.8 billion for the 2019 fiscal year). 
 18.  DEP’T. OF TRANSP., BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS FISCAL YEAR 2019 2 (2018), 
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/mission/budget/304476/508dotbh2019-
b.pdf [https://perma.cc/MDC8-8F93] (requesting a budget of $76.5 billion for the 2019 fiscal year).  
 19.  DEP’T. OF EDUC., FACT SHEET: PRESIDENT TRUMP’S FY 2019 BUDGET 1 (2018), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget19/budget-factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5A8J-X4U9] (requesting a budget of $63.2 billion for the 2019 fiscal year). 
 20.  DEP’T OF ENERGY, FY 2019 BUDGET FACT SHEET 1 (2018), 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/02/f48/DOE-FY2019-Budget-Fact-Sheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6DZ4-QHGE] (requesting a budget of $30.6 billion for the 2019 fiscal year).  
 21.  Cf. PAMELA HERD & DONALD MOYNIHAN, ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN: 
POLICYMAKING BY OTHER MEANS 22–30 (2019) (discussing the concept of administrative burden 
and outlining its components); see generally Elizabeth F. Emens, Admin, 103 GEO. L.J. 1409 
(2015) (explaining how administrative tasks, like paperwork, hinder the leisure, sleep, 
relationships, and work of individuals, especially women); ELIZABETH F. EMENS, LIFE ADMIN: 
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choose abortion, such burdens can be decisive impediments.22 They can 
also make it difficult for people to receive the Earned Income Tax 
Credit, which is one of the nation’s most beneficial antipoverty 
programs.23 In short, paperwork burdens have massive negative effects 
on people’s lives. 
Professor Richard H. Thaler has coined a helpful term for such 
burdens: sludge.24 The term should be taken to refer to the kind of 
friction, large or small, that people face when they want to go in one or 
another direction.25 For their own reasons, whether self-interested or 
altruistic, private and public institutions might impose or increase 
sludge. In the private sector, companies can use sludge to increase 
profits. For example, people might want to cancel a subscription to a 
magazine in which they no longer have the slightest interest, but to do 
that, they might have to wade through a great deal of sludge.26 In the 
public sector, sludge may be an accident, but it might also be a political 
choice. People might want to sign their child up for some beneficial 
program, such as free transportation or free school meals, but the 
 
HOW I LEARNED TO DO LESS, DO BETTER, AND LIVE MORE (2019) (illustrating the impact of 
administrative burdens in life and offering advice to mitigate it).  
 22.  See HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 71–72. 
 23.  Id. at 195–96. 
 24.  Richard H. Thaler, Nudge, Not Sludge, 361 SCIENCE 431 (2018). 
 25.  I am bracketing here the precise relationship between nudge and sludge. It is most useful 
to see both terms as descriptive rather than normative. It should be clear that nudges can be for 
good or for bad; on the bad, see GEORGE AKERLOF & ROBERT SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS 
(2015) (describing, among other examples, the strategies that Cinnabon founder Rich and Greg 
Komen developed to push people to making the “unhealthy” decision to eat a Cinnabon). It 
should also be clear that sludge can be for good or for bad. It is reasonable to see sludge as a kind 
of nudge, in the form of increased friction, which can nudge people in a helpful or unhelpful way. 
If people are nudged to choose healthy over unhealthy food, through good choice architecture, 
they might face sludge when they seek unhealthy food. To be sure, more work remains to be done 
on definitional issues. My hope is that the examples will be sufficient for purposes of the current 
discussion.  
 26.  For example, Citizens Advice, a network of independent charities helping consumers 
throughout the U.K., performed an analysis of cases and found that, in just three months, 
consumers paid an average of £160 toward unwanted subscriptions for gym memberships, 
television, insurance, and online streaming services; during that time, nine out of ten consumers 
who tried to cancel a subscription were initially refused by the company. Press Release, Citizens 
Advice, Citizens Advice Reveals Consumers Spend An Average of £160 on Unwanted 
Subscriptions During National Consumer Week (Nov. 27, 2017), 
https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/about-us/how-citizens-advice-works/media/press-releases/ 
citizens-advice-reveals-consumers-spend-an-average-of-160-on-unwanted-subscriptions-during-
national-consumer-week [https://perma.cc/U35F-GRTW].  
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sludge might defeat them.27 To obtain financial aid for college, students 
are required to fill out the Free Application for Federal Student Aid 
(“FAFSA”).28 It is long and complicated, and it requires young people 
to provide information that they might not have (some of it is on their 
parents’ tax returns).29 Many students give up.30 The right to vote may 
be the most fundamental of all, but a sludge-filled registration process 
may disenfranchise many millions of people.31 A sludge-reduction 
initiative be a Voting Rights Act. 
A great deal of evidence establishes that reducing administrative 
burdens can have a large impact on people’s lives. Millions of people 
are now benefiting from the Global Entry Program, which reduces 
time, trouble, and stress in security lines at airports.32 For free school 
 
 27.  A corrective is the direct certification program, discussed below. See DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
DIRECT CERTIFICATION IN THE NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM: STATE 
IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS, SCHOOL YEAR 2014–2015, at 2 (2015), 
https://www.fns.usda.gov/direct-certification-national-school-lunch-program-report-congress-
state-implementation-progress-0 [https://perma.cc/D6PP-X4GL]. 
 28.  See Eric Bettinger, Bridget Terry Long, Philip Oreopoulos & Lisa Sanbonmatsu, The 
Role of Simplification and Information in College Decisions: Results from the H&R Block FAFSA 
Experiment 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15361, 2009), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w15361 [https://perma.cc/66EG-VQXD] (“To determine eligibility, 
students and their families must fill out an eight-page, detailed application called the Free 
Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), which has over 100 questions.”). 
 29.  See Susan Dynarski & Mark Wiederspan, Student Aid Simplification: Looking Back and 
Looking Ahead 8–11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17834, 2012), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w17834 [https://perma.cc/5VTH-682V].  
 30.  Id. at 5 (“Millions of students and adult learners who aspire to college are overwhelmed 
by the complexity of student aid. Uncertainty and confusion robs them of its significant benefits.” 
(quoting ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON STUDENT FIN. ASSISTANCE, THE STUDENT AID 
GAUNTLET: MAKING ACCESS TO COLLEGE SIMPLE AND CERTAIN i (2005), 
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED496648.pdf [https://perma.cc/788M-DFZ8]).  
 31.  See, e.g., HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 47–60; LA. ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR 
THE  U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BARRIERS TO VOTING IN LOUISIANA 25–26 (2018), 
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2018/08-20-LA-Voting-Barriers.pdf [https://perma.cc/VCV4-BVQB] 
(recommending reduction in paperwork associated with voter registration to increase access to 
the polls); JONATHAN BRATER, KEVIN MORRIS, MYRNA PÉREZ & CHRISTOPHER DELUZIO, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, PURGES: A GROWING THREAT TO THE RIGHT TO VOTE (2018),  
http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/purges-growing-threat-right-vote [https://perma.cc/ 
74YE-P6ZP]; THE LEADERSHIP CONF. EDUC. FUND, THE GREAT POLL CLOSURE (2016), 
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/reports/2016/poll-closure-report-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/GRS7-
953K]. 
 32.  See Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Secretary Napolitano 
Announces Final Rule for Permanent Global Entry Program (Feb. 6, 2012), 
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/secretary-napolitano-announces-final-
rule-permanent-global-entry [https://perma.cc/G9WR-PUJB]. The program now has five million 
members. Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP Announces 5 Million Global 
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meals, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has adopted a “Direct 
Certification“ program, which means that parents do not have to take 
the trouble to enroll their children at all.33 If the school district has 
enough information to know that they are eligible, they are 
automatically enrolled.34 In the 2014–15 school year, more than 11 
million children benefited from the program (about 91 percent of the 
eligible population).35  
Simplification of FAFSA dramatically increases the likelihood 
that low-income people will apply for aid and eventually enroll in 
college.36 A number of states have adopted automatic voter 
registration, which means that if eligible citizens interact with a state 
agency (say, by receiving a driver’s license), they are registered as 
voters.37 In less than a year, Oregon’s automatic registration program 
produced more than 250,000 new voters, and almost 100,000 of them 
actually voted.38 The private sector can do a great deal more to reduce 
sludge—to help workers choose from among healthcare plans, to make 
life easier for consumers and employees with ideas or complaints, and 
to help people avoid serious risks.39  
 
Entry Members (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-
announces-5-million-global-entry-members [https://perma.cc/S5VF-HV87].  
 33.  See NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM, supra note 27, at 2 (“Direct certification 
typically involves matching SNAP, TANF, and FDPIR records against student enrollment lists, 
at either the State or the LEA level.”).  
 34.  Id. at 4. 
 35.  Id. at 15, 24.  
 36.  See Dynarski & Wiederspan, supra note 29, at 19; Bettinger et al., supra note 28, at 23.  
 37.   See Automatic Voter Registration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/automatic-voter-registration [https://perma.cc/6EPA-
GD5T]. As of 2018, thirteen states and the District of Columbia have approved automatic voter-
registration policies. These states are: Alaska, California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia. 
See History of AVR & Implementation Dates, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/history-avr-implementation-dates [https://perma.cc/ 
VXY8-RKQB]. 
 38.  ROB GRIFFIN, PAUL GRONKE, TOVA WANG & LIZ KENNEDY, CTR. FOR AM. PROG., 
WHO VOTES WITH AUTOMATIC VOTER REGISTRATION? IMPACT ANALYSIS OF OREGON’S 
FIRST-IN-THE-NATION PROGRAM (2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/ 
reports/2017/06/07/433677/votes-automatic-voter-registration/#fn-433677-2  [https://perma.cc/ 
9L7K-YPWX]. 
 39.  For valuable discussion, see generally Emens, Admin, supra note 21. In the healthcare 
context, see George Loewenstein et al., A Behavioral Blueprint for Improving Health Care Policy, 
3 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & POL’Y 53, 53–66 (2017). 
SUNSTEIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2019  3:59 PM 
2019] SLUDGE AND ORDEALS 1853 
II.  SLUDGE HURTS (AND CAN KILL) 
Sludge can make it difficult or impossible for people to enjoy or 
exercise constitutional rights. For freedom of speech, licensing schemes 
are the most obvious example; they are a form of sludge and are usually 
unconstitutional for that reason.40 The ban on prior restraints can be 
seen as a ban on sludge.41 In the domain of healthcare, the sludge 
imposed on doctors and patients can literally kill.42 In emergency 
rooms, for example, sludge has made it unnecessarily difficult for 
doctors to prescribe medicines that help patients overcome opioid 
addiction.43 Efforts to reduce that sludge, through private initiative and 
through law, can save lives.44 
To understand why sludge matters, let us begin with the 
assumption that people are fully rational and that in deciding whether 
to navigate forms, they make some calculation about costs and 
benefits. Even if the benefits are high, the relevant costs might prove 
overwhelming. These costs can take qualitatively different forms.45 
They might involve acquisition of information, which might be difficult 
and costly. They might involve time, which people might not have. 
They might be psychological, in the sense that they involve frustration, 
stigma, and humiliation. For any of those reasons, it might be very 
difficult to navigate or overcome the sludge. In some cases, doing the 
relevant paperwork might be literally impossible; it simply may not be 
feasible for people to fill out the forms. By themselves, these points 
help explain low take-up rates for many federal and state programs,46 
 
 40.  Cf. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575, 576 (1941) (upholding a licensing scheme 
that regulated only the “time, place and manner” of speech).  
 41. Cf. Thomas Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 
670 (1955) (describing prior restraint as a “particular method of control which experience has 
taught tends to create a potent and unnecessary mechanism of government that can smother free 
communication”). 
 42.  See Felice J. Freyer, Emergency Rooms Once Offered Little for Drug Users. That’s 
Starting to Change, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 10, 2018), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/12/09/emergency-rooms-once-had-little-offer-
addicted-people-that-starting-change/guX2LGPqG1UdAf9xUV9rXI/story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/FH6P-C2UF]. 
 43.  See id. 
 44.  See id. (describing Massachusetts General Hospital’s efforts to increase emergency-
room resources for patients addicted to opioids). 
 45.  See HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 23; Donald Moynihan, Pamela Herd & Hope 
Harvey Administrative Burden: Learning, Psychological, and Compliance Costs in Citizen-State 
Interactions, 25 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 43, 45–46 (2014) .   
 46. See Janet Currie, The Take up of Social Benefits 11–12 (Inst. for the Study of Labor in 
Bonn, Discussion Paper No. 1103, 2004) (examining rates of enrollment in social benefits within 
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as well as the immense difficulty that people often have in obtaining 
permits or licenses of various sorts.47 We can even see sludge as an 
obstacle to freedom, especially insofar as it reduces or impairs 
navigability.48 
A. “Everyone Believes In Redemption”  
An assortment of human biases, emphasized by behavioral 
economists, amplify the real-world effects of administrative burdens. 
For many people, inertia is a powerful force,49 and people tend to 
procrastinate.50 If people suffer from inertia and if they procrastinate, 
they might never do the necessary paperwork. The problem is 
compounded by “present bias.”51 The future often seems like a foreign 
country—Laterland—and people are not sure that they will ever visit. 
It is often tempting to put off administrative tasks until another day. 
That day may never come, even if the consequences of delay are quite 
serious. 
 
the United States and United Kingdom); see generally Katherine Baicker, William J. Congdon, & 
Sendhil Mullainathan, Health Insurance Coverage and Take-Up: Lessons from Behavioral 
Economics, 90 MILBANK Q. 107 (2012) (examining low health-insurance take-up rates from a 
behavioral-economic perspective); Carole Roan Gresenz, Sarah E. Edgington, Miriam Laugesen, 
& José J. Escarce, Take-Up of Public Insurance and Crowd-Out of Private Insurance Under Recent 
CHIP Expansions to Higher Income Children, 47 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1999 (2012) (analyzing 
the effect of expanding CHIP eligibility on health-insurance take-up rates); Saurabh Bhargava & 
Dayanand Manoli, Improving Take-Up of Tax Benefits in the United States, ABDUL LATIF 
JAMEEL POVERTY ACTION LAB (2015), https://www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluation/improving-
take-tax-benefits-united-states [https://perma.cc/TPW8-XDHU] (noting that “many people who 
are eligible for social and economic benefits do not claim those benefits” in the United States).  
 47.  REGULATORY REFORM TEAM, Case Study: Chicago Licensing and Permitting Reform, 
DATA-SMART CITY SOLUTIONS (Mar. 19, 2015), https://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/ 
article/case-study-chicago-licensing-and-permitting-reform-647 [https://perma.cc/X3YJ-JSLM] 
(assessing the regulatory landscape of the city of Chicago, and finding, among other things, that 
“[a]pproximately 17% of zoning licenses were not being processed and sent back due to 
insufficient information”).  
 48.  On this theme, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ON FREEDOM (2019).  
 49.  Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) 
Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON 1149, 1185 (2001) (identifying inertia as a force 
working against participation in 401(k) plans); see also John Pottow & Omri Ben-Shahar, On the 
Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 651, 651 (2006) (“It is by now recognized that 
factors beyond drafting costs might also cause parties to stick with an undesirable default rule . . . 
.”).  
 50.  George Akerlof, Procrastination and Obedience, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 1–17 (1991) 
(examining several “behavioral patholog[ies],” including procrastination). 
 51.  See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Present Bias: Lessons Learned and to be 
Learned, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 273, 273–78 (2015). 
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Mail-in forms impose a type of sludge.52 They provide people with 
an opportunity to obtain a nontrivial gain, often in the form of a check, 
but they require people to overcome inertia. As an illustration of the 
relationship between behavioral biases and sludge, consider a study of 
people’s failure to redeem such forms, with a memorably precise name: 
Everyone Believes In Redemption.53 Across various markets, 
redemption rates usually range between 10 percent and 40 percent, 
which means that a strong majority of customers forget or simply do 
not bother.54 Because of the power of inertia, that might not be terribly 
surprising. What is more striking is the finding that people are 
unrealistically optimistic about the likelihood that they will ever 
redeem forms.55 In the relevant study, people thought that there was 
about an 80 percent chance that they would do so within the 30 days 
they were given.56 The actual redemption rate was 31 percent.57 It is an 
overstatement to say that everyone believes in redemption—but most 
people certainly do. 
In the same study, the researchers made three efforts (with 
different groups of people) to reduce the massive difference between 
the predicted and actual redemption rates. First, they informed 
participants, very clearly, that in previous groups with similar people, 
redemption rates were below one-third.58 Second, they issued two clear 
reminders, one soon after purchase and another when the deadline for 
redemption was near.59 Third, they made redemption far simpler by 
eliminating the requirement that people must print out and sign a 
certification page.60 
As it turned out, not one of the three interventions reduced 
people’s optimism. In all conditions, people thought there was about 
an 80 percent chance that they would mail in the forms.61 Moreover, 
and somewhat surprisingly, the first two interventions had no effect on 
 
 52.  See Matthew Edwards, The Law, Marketing and Behavioral Economics of Consumer 
Rebates, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 362, 419–21 (2007).  
 53.  Joshua Tasoff & Robert Letzler, Everyone Believes in Redemption: Nudges and 
Overoptimism in Costly Task Completion, 107 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 107, 115 (2014). 
 54.  Id. at 108. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id.  
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 113. 
 59.  Id.  
 60.  Id. at 114. 
 61.  Id. at 115. 
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what people actually did. When hearing about the behavior of other 
groups, people apparently thought, “Well, those are other groups. 
What do they have to do with us?” In other contexts, reminders often 
work because they focus people’s attention and reduce the power of 
inertia. But in this case, reminders turned out to be useless.62  
The only effective intervention was simplification, which had a 
strong impact on what people actually did.63 By making it easier to mail 
in the form and thus reducing sludge, simplification significantly 
increased people’s willingness to act. The redemption rate rose to 
about 54 percent, which means that the disparity between belief and 
behavior was cut in half.64 
B. Behavioral Biases and Sludge 
The relevant study is of course relatively narrow, but it has large 
implications. Recall that inertia is a powerful force and that, because 
of inertia, people might not fill out necessary forms.65 That is one 
reason that participation rates are often much lower with opt-in designs 
than with opt-out designs.66 Recall too that inertia is aggravated by 
present bias, leading people to focus on the short term and neglect the 
future.67 
Suppose in this light that under federal regulations, individuals, 
small businesses, and startups must fill out certain forms in order to be 
eligible for important benefits or to avoid significant penalties. They 
might intend to do exactly that, but if the task can be put off, or if it is 
burdensome or difficult, their behavior might not match their 
intentions. The actual costs might turn out to be very high; the 
perceived costs might be far higher. To get slightly ahead of the story: 
 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id.  
 64.  Id. 
 65.  See Madrian & Shea, supra note 49, at 1185; see generally William Samuelson & Richard 
Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) (finding 
that status quo bias influences students’ decisions about healthcare plans and retirement 
programs). 
 66.  For an especially dramatic illustration, see Peter Bergman, Jessica Lasky-Fink & Todd 
Rogers, Simplification and Defaults Affect Adoption and Impact of Technology, But Decision 
Makers Do Not Realize This (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research Working Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. RWP17-021, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233874 [https://perma.cc/ 
YWN6-BBCJ]. 
 67.  See Keith Marzilli Ericson & David Laibson, Intertemporal Choice 27–32 (Nat. Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25358, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25358 
[https://perma.cc/E9TG-5FAS] (reviewing models and empirical research on present bias). 
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it would make sense for federal regulators to “scrub” existing 
paperwork burdens to make sure that they are not doing unintended 
or inadvertent harm. That is the idea of a “Sludge Audit.” 
The right to vote may be the most fundamental of all, and federal 
law requires states to send mail-in forms (“return cards”) before 
purging voters from electoral rolls on change-of-residence grounds (if 
a voter has not already confirmed a move).68 Each state is allowed to 
choose its own trigger for sending the return card. Some states use 
change-of-address information provided by the United States Postal 
Service,69 but others use methods that can very foreseeably flag voters 
who have in fact not moved and thus remain eligible.70 A qualified 
voter can be struck for failing to mail the return card back and not 
voting for four years.71 Voters—along with Congress72 and the Supreme 
Court73—may be optimistic that they will do that, but their optimism 
might be misplaced. 
More generally, sludge has a significant impact that many people 
do not foresee. As the redemption study shows, people are 
unrealistically optimistic about the likelihood that they will overcome 
inertia. Even specialists might be surprised at the extent to which 
apparently promising strategies fail. In addition, sludge can be used 
 
 68.  National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 52 U.S.C. § 20507(d) (2012). This provision of 
the National Voter Registration Act, among other purposes, is aimed to “ensure that accurate 
and current voter registration rolls are maintained.”  52 U.S.C. § 20501(b)(4). 
 69.  This is the practice suggested by federal law. See 52 U.S.C. § 20507(c)(1). Thirty-six 
states do at least this. See NAT’L ASSN. OF SECRETARIES OF STATE, NASS REPORT: 
MAINTENANCE OF STATE VOTER REGISTRATION LISTS 5–6 (2017) (Dec. 2017), 
https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/reports/nass-report-voter-reg-maintenance-final-
dec17.pdf [https://perma.cc/FXJ6-RPXK]. 
 70.  See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 48A.28.3 (2018) (permitting the sending of notice each year); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-234(a)(1)–(2) (2018) (notice sent to registrants with whom there has been 
“no contact” for three years); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 25, § 1901(b)(3) (2018) (notice sent to voters 
who have not voted in five years); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.21(B)(2) (2018) (notice sent to 
those who fail to vote in two consecutive federal elections). Note also that some states trigger 
notices based on dubious interstate databases. See, e.g., OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 230:15–11–
19(a)(3) (2018) (notice sent to those who have not voted since the “second previous General 
Election” and those who fail references to interstate databases); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 6.50(1) (2018) 
(notice sent to voters who have not voted in four years); see also JONATHAN BRATER, ET AL., 
supra note 31, at 7–8 (explaining how the system used by Oklahoma, “Crosscheck,” is unreliable 
and inaccurate). 
 71.  See 52 U.S.C. § 20507(d)(1)(ii). 
 72.  52 U.S.C. § 20507(d) makes failure to send the return card back one of the two sufficient 
conditions for removing a registered voter from the rolls on change-of-address grounds. 
 73.  Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1845 (2018) (rejecting the argument 
that voters throw away return cards so often as to make them “worthless”). 
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opportunistically by clever marketers who seek to give consumers the 
impression that they will receive an excellent deal but who know that 
consumers will not take advantage of the opportunity.74 In many cases, 
government officials are not seeking to act opportunistically; they are 
responding to political values and commitments, which is not the same 
thing.75 At the same time, sludge might have a damaging effect that 
they do not anticipate. In particular, officials might not understand the 
extent to which sludge will adversely affect a population that they are 
seeking to help.  
C. Cognition and Scarcity 
With respect to redemption, the power of simplification puts a 
spotlight on the large consequences of seemingly modest 
administrative burdens—on the effects of “choice architecture” in 
determining outcomes.76 I have noted that in many domains, 
participation rates can be dramatically increased with a mere shift from 
requiring people to apply (opt-in) to automatically enrolling them (opt-
out).77 In an especially dramatic study, Professors Peter Bergman of 
Columbia University and Todd Rogers of Harvard University found 
that if parents are asked whether they want to sign up to receive text-
message alerts about the academic progress of their children, 
participation rates are tiny—around 1 percent.78 If the signup process 
is simplified, participation rates increase significantly, to about 8 
percent.79 But if parents are automatically signed up, participation rates 
jump to 96 percent.80 To be sure, most changes in choice architecture 
 
 74.  For relevant discussion, see Petra Persson, Attention Manipulation and Information 
Overload, 2 BEHAVIOURAL PUB. POL’Y 78 (2018); Thomas Blake, Sarah Moshary, Kane 
Sweeney & Steven Tadelis, Price Salience and Product Choice (NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. 
RESEARCH, Working Paper No. 25186, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25186?sy=186 
[https://perma.cc/Y54U-9K9S].  
 75.  See Moynihan et al., supra note 45, at 65 (outlining how burdens may be imposed to 
serve legitimate political values). 
 76.  See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 83–105 (2008) 
(describing choice architecture). 
 77.  See Eric Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCIENCE 1338, 
1338–39 (2003) (explaining that organ donation increases when it is opt-out rather than opt-in). 
 78.  Peter Bergman & Todd Rogers, The Impact of Defaults on Technology Adoption 5 
(Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. RWP17-
021, 2018), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/todd_rogers/files/bergman_and_rogers_the 
_impact_of_defaults.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7GF-BCY9]. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
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do not have effects of that magnitude.81 But simplification and burden 
reduction do not merely reduce frustration; they can change people’s 
lives. 
An underlying reason is that our cognitive resources are limited.82 
Inevitably, we are able to focus on only a small subset of life’s 
challenges. For those who are busy, poor, disabled, or elderly, the 
problem of cognitive scarcity is especially serious.83 For that reason, it 
is important to focus on the distributional effects of administrative 
burdens—on whom they are most likely to hurt.84  
As a practical matter, the answer is often the poorest among us. A 
central reason is that if you are poor, you have to focus on a wide range 
of immediately pressing problems.85 If the government is asking poor 
people to navigate a complex system or to fill out a lot of forms, they 
might give up. But the problem is hardly limited to the poor. When 
programs are designed to benefit the elderly, sludge might be especially 
damaging, at least if the population suffers from reduced cognitive 
capacity. For different reasons, the problem of sex equality deserves 
particular attention.86 Because women do a disproportionate amount 
of administrative work—running the household, arranging meals, 
taking care of children—a significant reduction in sludge could address 
a pervasive source of social inequality, with ramifying effects on other 
areas of life.  
 
 81.  See, e.g., Madrian & Shea, supra note 49, at 1184 (summarizing behavioral changes 
resulting from 401(k) participation and savings behavior as a result of changing default options). 
For a discussion of the effect of inertia on choice of travel modes, see Alessandro Innocenti, 
Patrizia Lattarulo & Maria Grazia Pazienza, Heuristics and Biases in Travel Mode Choice 20 
(LabSi, Working Paper No. 27/2009, 2009), http://www.labsi.org/wp/labsi27.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/P23F-42UL]. 
 82.  See Xavier Gabaix, Behavioral Inattention (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 24096, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24096 [https://perma.cc/FQ2L-M3VN]. 
 83.  See SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY: WHY HAVING TOO 
LITTLE MEANS SO MUCH 147–66 (2013).  
 84.  See HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21. For helpful related discussion, see Jessica 
Roberts, Nudge-Proof: Distributive Justice and the Ethics of Nudging, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1045 
(2018). The idea has support in the PRA, which requires “particular emphasis on those individuals 
and entities most adversely affected.” 44 U.S.C. § 3504(c)(3) (2012). 
 85.  For a series of demonstrations, see HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 30–31. 
 86.  See text accompanying supra note 21 (explaining that a disproportionate amount of 
everyday administrative burdens fall on women). 
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III.  A VERY QUICK TOUR OF THE HORIZON 
It would be valuable to catalogue an assortment of programs that 
have been adversely affected, to varying degrees, by sludge.87 A book 
could easily be written on that topic. Instead of venturing that, I will 
borrow heavily from a superb treatment by Professors Pamela Herd 
and Donald Moynihan, who offer a series of case studies. Herd and 
Moynihan demonstrate that in some programs, burdens are a serious 
problem, but in others, the government has ensured that they are 
negligible. With respect to sludge, a model program is Social Security, 
which is simple and in many ways automatic. As Herd and Moynihan 
put it, “the biggest bookkeeping organization in the world banished 
burdens.”88 The U.S. government bears the relevant administrative 
burdens, and it generally requires citizens to do very little. The Social 
Security Administration (“SSA”) tracks people’s earnings and 
determines eligibility and benefit levels automatically. If you are 
eligible, you can enroll online or go to one of the nation’s 1200 field 
offices.89 After you do that, you are likely to receive direct deposits into 
your bank account within a month.90  
As a matter of history, there is a large irony here. In the 1930s, the 
supposed administrative challenge was taken as a serious objection to 
the very idea of Social Security.91 But the federal government 
succeeded it meeting that challenge. It did so in part through the 
creation and use of Social Security numbers, which make it much 
simpler to track people’s earnings over their entire working lives.92 The 
SSA has worked hard and mostly successfully to cut sludge and thus to 
make things easy for beneficiaries, replacing lost Social Security cards, 
taking applications, updating records, and ensuring the accuracy of 
payments.93 For beneficiaries, the program is working. The poverty 
rate among older adults is now just 9 percent; if Social Security were 
not included in their income, it would be 40 percent.94 Almost one-third 
 
 87.  For a valuable discussion of sludge in the context of medical education, see generally 
Joel Yager & Jeffrey E. Katzman, Bureaucrapathologies: Galloping Regulosis, Assessment 
Degradosis, and Other Unintended Organizational Maladies in Post-Graduate Medical Education, 
39 ACAD. PSYCHIATRY 678 (2015).   
 88.  Id. at 215.  
 89.  Id. at 233. 
 90.  Id. at 215. 
 91.  Id. at 219; 225–26. 
 92.  Id. at 227. 
 93.  Id. at 233. 
 94.  Id. at 237. 
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of beneficiaries rely on the program for at least 90 percent of their 
income.95  
The level of sludge is also relatively low for the Earned Income 
Tax Credit (“EITC”), a wage subsidy for low-income workers.96 Most 
programs designed to benefit poor people have dispiriting take-up 
rates of between 30 and 60 percent; for the EITC, the rate is about 80 
percent.97 That is excellent news, for the EITC ranks among the most 
effective of U.S. antipoverty programs. Because it makes work more 
remunerative, it significantly increases labor-force participation.98 The 
EITC also makes a major dent in the national poverty rate and helps 
children in particular, with beneficial effects on their health, their 
cognitive abilities, and their long-term educational prospects.99 
For the EITC, the relatively high take-up rate is a product of 
relatively low levels of sludge. The paperwork requirements are 
modest; a standard tax return is all that is necessary. The Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) sends simple, clear reminders to people who 
appear to be eligible, and the reminders significantly increase 
participation rates.100 It also runs voluntary programs that provide free 
tax help. Because participation involves little in the way of frustration 
or stigma, the psychological costs are low. True, the EITC is not as 
simple or automatic as Social Security, and sludge reduction thus 
remains a priority. If 20 percent of eligible people are not receiving the 
benefit, there is a serious problem. The IRS almost certainly knows 
enough to enroll people automatically and send a refund to eligible 
taxpayers.101 Nonetheless, the administrative burdens for recipients are 
much lower than they might be, partly because of an unlikely coalition 
between business interests and those seeking to help the working 
poor.102 
 
 95.  Id.  
 96.   For a general discussion, see MAKING WORK PAY (Bruce Meyer & Douglas Holtz-
Eakin eds. 2002). 
 97.  HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 191. 
 98.  Id. at 196. 
 99.  Id. at 194. 
 100.  Id. at 196. 
 101.  Surprisingly, there appears to be no literature on automatic enrollment and the EITC. 
This area deserves sustained study. 
 102.  Id. at 213. 
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Herd and Moynihan contrast benefits programs that impose far 
more daunting burdens. For the Affordable Care Act,103 federalism has 
turned out to be a major challenge. Opposed to the very idea of 
Obamacare, twenty-seven states simply refused to adopt exchanges, 
which were supposed to provide people with a simple, relatively 
sludge-free way to buy health insurance.104 Citizens in those states have 
had to apply through federal exchanges, and that is far more 
cumbersome. Successful applicants initially receive a notice from the 
federal government that they are eligible for the state Medicaid 
program. The federal government then transfers the file to the state. 
After that, the state determines eligibility.105 This process can take 
months, and it has left millions of people in limbo. The Obama 
administration reduced burdens by publicizing the program and by 
simplifying coordination. But the Trump administration reduced 
funding for publicity and shortened the signup period.106  
Medicare is a nearly universal program aimed at older people.107 
Those who are eligible for Social Security are usually eligible for 
Medicare too. The sludge comes from the astonishingly complex 
process faced by Medicare enrollees when choosing among services. 
What is the right supplemental insurance plan? What is the right 
prescription drug plan? Is a Medicare Advantage Plan a good idea? 
These are difficult questions, and as Herd and Moynihan emphasize, 
older adults often suffer from cognitive decline.108 They quote a 
Medicare beneficiary who notes, “That’s what gets me, they wait until 
we retire to make it complicated.”109 A great deal of behavioral 
evidence finds that Medicare beneficiaries are making poor choices 
and losing money in the process.110 For that reason, there is a good 
 
 103.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012)). 
 104.  HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 98. 
 105.  Id. at 99. 
 106.  Id. at 118. 
 107.  Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections at 25, 26, 29 & 42 U.S.C. (2012)). Medicare is understood in four parts. 
Hospital insurance in Part A, 42 U.S.C. § 1395c; supplemental medical insurance in Part B, 42 
U.S.C. § 1395j; managed care in Part C, 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21; and drug benefits in Part D, 42 
U.S.C. § 1395w-101. 
 108.  HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 134–35. 
 109.  Id. at 134. 
 110.  See Saurabh Bhargava, George Loewenstein & Justin Sydnor, Choose to Lose: Health 
Plan Choices From a Menu With Dominated Options, 132 Q. J. ECON. 1319, 1322 (2017) (noting 
that in both experimental and field studies, individuals did not select the most financially efficient 
Medicare plans). 
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argument that the government should simplify the process with the use 
of online tools, telephone assistance (with shorter waiting times), and 
customized recommendations.111  
Under current law, states are allowed to regulate the abortion 
right so long as their regulations do not impose an “undue burden.”112 
Because that standard has a degree of elasticity, it invites states to take 
steps to discourage abortion. They have enthusiastically taken up the 
invitation.113 For example, states have required pregnant women to 
engage in mandatory counselling, which includes descriptions not only 
of the procedure but also of fetal pain. They have required women to 
take and see an ultrasound, to make multiple visits to clinics, and to 
undergo significant waiting periods.114 These requirements impose 
evident costs in terms of learning, compliance, and psychology.  
To capture those costs, Herd and Moynihan offer an extensive 
quotation from a thirty-five-year-old woman, describing her 
experience of navigating administrative burdens in Wisconsin. Here is 
an excerpt: 
I am shaken. I am embarrassed. I am tired of waiting. I am now called 
into a room. I can bring Hubby this time. We are told to watch a video, 
again required by state law. The video talks about adoption, foster 
parenthood, the dangers of abortion, my rights. It drags on. I feel like 
a small child. Husband looks concerned and helpless. I sign a form 
indicating my understanding of the information presented on the 
video. We wait. A nurse finally comes back in. Time to go back to the 
waiting room. We’ll call you in a short while.115 
These administrative burdens have had an impact. According to 
one study, they increase the cost of abortion by 19 percent and decrease 
the number of abortions by between 13 and 15 percent.116 One 
consequence appears to be an increase in the incidence of self-
administered abortions.117  
 
 111.  HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 138. 
 112.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992). 
 113.  See HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 90–92; Kate L. Fetrow, Note, Taking 
Abortion Rights Seriously: Toward a Holistic Undue Burden Jurisprudence, 70 STAN. L. REV. 319, 
322 (2018) (noting that the “undue burden” standard allows states to chip away at the right to an 
abortion).   
 114.  Id. at 71. 
 115.  HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 78–79. 
 116.  Id. at 82.  
 117.  Id.  
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The Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, forbidding 
denial of the vote “on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude,” was ratified in 1870,118 but administrative burdens have long 
been used to disenfranchise African Americans. For decades, literacy 
tests were a favorite instrument; they were eventually forbidden by the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965.119 In recent years, administrative burdens 
have become less onerous, in the sense that voting is more convenient, 
and registration is generally easier.120 But such burdens continue to 
exist, and in some states, they are mounting. They are plainly being 
used as a political weapon, most prominently by Republican leaders 
seeking to impose sludge so as to increase their electoral prospects.121 
Some states are purging from the voter rolls people who have not 
voted for a specified number of years or responded to a notice, thus 
requiring them to register again.122 Other states are purging voters on 
the basis of flawed technologies designed to prevent noncitizens or 
felons from voting.123 Some states require state-issued photo 
identification.124 That might not seem so onerous, but according to 
some estimates, about 11 percent of Americans do not have a state-
issued photo identification (including about 25 percent of African 
Americans).125 States have also increased residency requirements and 
required proof of citizenship.126 With respect to the right to vote, 
administrative burdens of multiple kinds are working to disenfranchise 
African Americans, the elderly, and low-income individuals.127  
 
 118.  U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 119.  Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101, 
10301–10314, 10501–10508, 10701–10702 (2012)). Literacy tests are prohibited under 52  
U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(C).  
 120.  HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 47. 
 121.  Id. at 63–64 (noting the correlation between Republican states and voter ID laws and 
explaining the correlation with party policies). 
 122.  See text accompanying supra, note 71; see also HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 
53 
 123.  See BRATER ET AL., supra note 31, at 5–10. 
 124.  See Voter Identification Requirements: Voter ID Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/QF6Z-VAKK] (noting that 34 states have laws requesting or requiring voters to show 
some form of identification to vote, and seven of those require state-issued photo identification).  
 125.  Denise Lieberman, Barriers to the Ballot Box: New Restrictions Underscore the Need for 
Voting Laws Enforcement, 39 HUM. RTS. 2, 3 (2012).  
 126.  See HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 52. 
 127.  Id. at 2. 
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IV.  JUSTIFYING SLUDGE 
Notwithstanding these points, paperwork burdens often serve 
important goals. Sometimes they are indispensable. As the examples 
suggest, we can readily imagine five possible justifications for sludge: 
(1) program integrity, (2) self-control problems, (3) privacy, (4) 
targeting, and (5) data collection. 
A. Program Integrity 
When agencies impose paperwork burdens, it is often because of 
a desire to ensure that programs work in the way that the law requires. 
One reason involves eligibility restrictions; another involves record-
keeping. What is true for the private sector is true for the public sector 
as well. Those who seek a loan, private or public, face sludge. The 
central reason is to ensure that they actually qualify. People should not 
receive Medicare, Medicaid, the EITC, or Social Security unless they 
are entitled to the relevant benefits, and sludge is often a way of 
collecting necessary information. Even in the context of voting rights, 
burdens of various sorts can be and often are justified as a means of 
ensuring that would-be voters meet existing legal requirements. For 
spending programs, a usual justification for paperwork burdens points 
to “fraud, waste, and abuse”;128 sludge can be an effort to reduce all 
three.  
It is true that with the increasing availability of information and 
with machine learning, private and public institutions might be able to 
find the relevant information on their own. In the private sector, some 
companies use the idea of “prequalification,” which means that they 
have enough information to know, in advance, that some people are 
already qualified for goods or services.129 Sometimes forms can be 
 
 128.  See 6 U.S.C. § 795 (2012) (“The Administrator shall ensure that all programs within the 
Agency administering Federal disaster relief assistance develop and maintain proper internal 
management controls to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse.”); Jerry L. Mashaw & 
Theodore R. Marmor, Conceptualizing, Estimating, and Reforming Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in 
Healthcare Spending, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 455 (1994); Julie K. Taitsman, Educating Physicians to 
Prevent Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 102, 102 (2011); 6 U.S.C. § 795 (“The 
Administrator shall ensure that all programs within the Agency administering Federal disaster 
relief assistance develop and maintain proper internal management controls to prevent and detect 
fraud, waste, and abuse.”).   
 129.  For a prescient discussion, see generally Ekambaram Paleenswaran & Mohan 
Kumaraswamy, Recent Advances and Proposed Improvements in Contractor Prequalification 
Methodologies, 36 BUILDING & ENV’T 73 (2001).  
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“prepopulated”; as a result, forms might not be necessary.130 In the 
domain of taxation, one example is the idea of return-free filing, which 
eliminates the need for taxpayers to fill out forms at all.131 In the 
fullness of time, we should see significant movements in this 
direction.132 
But those movements remain incipient. For the present and the 
near future, the most obvious justifications for sludge go by the name 
of “program integrity.”133 Suppose that the IRS decided to send the 
EITC to apparently eligible taxpayers. If it could do so at low cost, and 
if the apparently eligible taxpayers are in fact eligible, there would be 
little ground for objection. The problem, of course, is the word 
“apparently.” It is possible that some of the recipients will not in fact 
be eligible. Whenever people are automatically enrolled in a program, 
some of them may not meet the legal criteria.  
When this is so, regulators must choose between (1) a design 
ensuring that some eligible people will not receive a benefit and (2) a 
design ensuring that some ineligible people will receive a benefit. If the 
idea of program integrity is meant to refer to the number of errors, the 
 
 130.  Note the emphasis on prepopulation in Memorandum from Neomi Rao, Admin., OIRA, 
to Chief Information Officers 8 (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/Minimizing-Paperwork-and-Reporting-Burdens-Data-Call-for-the-
2018-ICB.pdf [https://perma.cc/KF9L-N6NZ] [hereinafter Memorandum from Neomi Rao (Aug. 
6, 2018)] (“Sometimes agencies collect data that are unchanged from prior applications; in such 
circumstances, they may be able to use, or to give people the option to use, pre-populated 
electronic forms.”). 
 131.  See AUSTAN GOOLSBEE, BROOKINGS INST., THE ‘SIMPLE RETURN’: REDUCING 
AMERICA’S TAX BURDEN THROUGH RETURN-FREE FILING 2 (2006), https:// 
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/200607goolsbee.pdf  [https://perma.cc/C695-
5YQL] (“For the millions of taxpayers who could use the Simple Return, however, filing a tax 
return would entail nothing more than checking the numbers, signing the return, and then either 
sending a check or getting a refund.”). 
 132.  See Memorandum from Neomi Rao (Aug. 6, 2018) supra note 130, at 8 (“Also worth 
considering is whether, in some circumstances, to dispense with forms entirely and to rely on more 
automatic, generic, or direct approval of participation.”) 
 133.  See Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 
2242 (2015) (referring to Title II as “Program Integrity” and specifically intending to reduce 
fraudulent and improper payments in the EITC and other programs); Leslie Book, David 
Williams & Krista Holub, Insights from Behavioral Economics Can Improve Administration of 
the EITC, 37 VA. TAX REV. 177, 180 (2018) (noting that “[p]rogram integrity” of the EITC was 
an important topic among employees of the IRS because 43 to 50 percent of all EITC returns are 
incorrect, with most errors benefitting claimants); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
Program Integrity, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/program-integrity/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/2ZMC-XTSH] (Medicaid Program Integrity); Reducing Improper Payments, 
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/improperpayments [https://perma.cc/T8ZN-XA32] 
(Social Security programs). 
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choice between (1) and (2) might turn purely on arithmetic. Which 
group is larger? If automatic enrollment means that 500,000 eligible 
people receive the benefit who otherwise would not, and if a degree of 
sludge means that 499,999 ineligible people receive the benefit who 
otherwise would not, automatic enrollment is justified.  
But it would be possible to see things differently. Suppose that 
automatic enrollment gives benefits to 200,000 eligible people but also 
to 200,001 ineligible people. Some people might think that if the 
200,001 people are nearly eligible—if they are relatively poor—it is not 
so terrible if they receive some economic help. But other people might 
insist that taxpayer money is accompanied by clear restrictions and 
argue that if it is given out in violation of those restrictions, a grave 
wrong has been committed. On this view, even a modest breach of 
program integrity, for the advantage of those who are not eligible, is 
unacceptable.  
The most extreme version of this view would be that a grant of 
benefits to a very large number of eligibles would not outweigh the 
grant of benefits to a very small number of ineligibles. From a welfarist 
standpoint, the most extreme version is hard or perhaps impossible to 
defend: a grant of benefits to a hundred people who are almost (but 
not) eligible would seem to be a price worth paying in exchange for a 
grant of benefits to a million people who are in fact eligible. But the 
correct tradeoff is not self-evident, and reasonable people might differ. 
We can generalize this example. In the direct-certification 
program for school lunches, the level of accuracy appears to be very 
high; few ineligible children are allowed to qualify.134 When sludge is 
eliminated through automaticity, objections are weakened when 
benefits are not conferred on the ineligible. To the extent that they are, 
tradeoffs are inevitable, and different people can make different 
judgments. Consider the question of voter registration. Sludge has 
been defended as a way of combatting the risk of fraud and thus 
ensuring the integrity of the voting process.135 On imaginable 
 
 134.  See NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM, supra note 27, at xiii (noting that states are 
required by federal law to “establish a system of direct certification of school-age SNAP 
participants”). To identify eligible students, most states compare SNAP files to enrolled student 
files and match them with varying criteria. Massachusetts uses first and last name along with date 
of birth as primary matching criteria, but the other states surveyed use multiple criteria that make 
an improper match unlikely. Id. at 28–33.  
 135.  See, e.g., Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1848 (“The NVRA plainly 
reflects Congress’s judgment that the failure to send back the card, coupled with the failure to 
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assumptions, sludge reduction could ensure that eligible people are 
allowed to vote while also ensuring that the same is true of (some) 
ineligible voters. The size of the two categories surely matters. 
B. Self-Control Problems 
Administrative burdens of diverse kinds might be designed to 
promote better decisions—to counteract self-control problems, 
recklessness, and impulsivity. Sludge can be a way of protecting people 
against their own errors. For that reason, sludge can easily be judged 
as a cure for a behavioral problem. Behavioral scientists sometimes 
contrast System 1 with System 2, where System 1 is rapid, intuitive, and 
often emotional, and System 2 is deliberative and reflective.136 Sludge 
is a way to strengthen the hand of System 2. 
For mundane decisions, small administrative burdens are 
frequently imposed online, with questions asking whether you are 
“sure you want to” send an email without a subject line, activate a 
ticket, cancel a recent order, or delete a file. Those burdens can be an 
excellent idea.  
A degree of sludge, imposed by private and public institutions, 
might make sense for life-altering decisions, such as marriage and 
divorce.137 “Cooling-off periods” can be a blessing.138 If System 1 is 
leading people to make rash decisions, a mandatory waiting time might 
be useful as a way of allowing System 2 to have its say.139 Some sludge 
 
vote during the period covering the next two general federal elections, is significant evidence that 
the addressee has moved.”). 
 136.  See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 13–15 (2011). 
 137.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.04 (2018) (making the effective date of marriage licenses 
three days after application unless both partners take a premarital education course); MASS. ANN. 
LAWS ch. 208, § 21 (2018) (allowing divorce to become absolute 90 days after the initial 
judgment). 
 138.  See Pamaria Rekaiti & Roger Van den Bergh, Cooling-Off Periods in the Consumer 
Laws of the EC Member States: A Comparative Law and Economics Approach, 23 J. CONSUMER 
POL’Y 371, 397 (2000) (“Cooling-off periods are potential remedies for the problems of irrational 
behaviour, situational monopoly, and informational asymmetry.”); Dainn Wie & Hyoungjong 
Kim, Between Calm and Passion: The Cooling-Off Period and Divorce Decisions in Korea, 21 
FEMINIST ECON. 187, 209 (2015) (“The cooling-off period has no significant impact on divorce 
rates when the cause of divorce is . . . dishonesty, abuse, or discord with other family members. . . 
. [C]ouples reporting the cause of divorce as personality difference or financial distress responded 
to the cooling-off periods.”). 
 139.  See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1187–88 (2003); see generally Wie & Kim, supra note 138 (finding that 
the mandatory cooling-off period for divorce reduced the final divorce rate in Korea).  
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might also make sense before the purchase of guns, partly as a way of 
promoting deliberation.140  
The abortion right is highly controversial, of course, but for that 
very reason, it is an especially interesting example. For example, some 
people think that counseling requirements and mandatory 24-hour 
waiting periods are legitimate ways of protecting women from making 
decisions that they will regret, or of protecting fetal life. Other people 
think that the burdens are simply an effort to discourage the exercise 
of a constitutional right.141 But even if we bracket the deepest issues, it 
is hardly impossible, in light of the stakes of the decision, to defend 
some administrative burdens as efforts to promote reflection and to 
provide valuable information.  
C. Privacy and Security 
Administrative burdens are often imposed in order to obtain 
information about people’s backgrounds—their employment history, 
their income, their criminal history (if any), their credit rating, their 
family history, their places of residence. Those who seek to work in 
government, certainly at levels that involve national security, are 
required to provide a great deal of information of that sort.142 It is at 
least reasonable to think that if private and public institutions are to 
receive some or all of that information, it must be with people’s explicit 
consent. If so, the question is whether to ask people to face 
administrative burdens or instead to intrude on their privacy. Perhaps 
it is not so terrible if the government chooses the former. 
At one period, of course, officials had no real option. They could 
not intrude on privacy, because they lacked the means to do so. 
Increasingly, however, private and public institutions actually have 
independent access to that information, or they might be able to obtain 
it with a little effort. As a result, they are in a position to reduce sludge. 
Return, as a simple example, to the Direct Certification program of the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture.143 Officials know who is poor, and so 
 
 140.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 26815(a) (2018) (requiring a waiting period of ten days 
for all firearm purchases). 
 141.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 918–21 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing these potential justifications but concluding 
that the 24-hour waiting period is unconstitutional). 
 142.  For an example, see U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., STANDARD FORM 86: 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY POSITIONS (2010), https://www.opm.gov/forms/ 
pdf_fill/sf86-non508.pdf [https://perma.cc/KB9P-JJ8D]. 
 143.  See supra note 27 and accompanying text.  
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they can directly certify them. In countless other cases, available data 
can enable private or public institutions to announce, very simply, that 
certain people are eligible, and on what terms. They might be able to 
prepopulate forms. They might be able to share data.144 To that extent, 
sludge can be a thing of the past. 
But would that be desirable? Not necessarily. Automatic 
enrollment might well depend on a great deal of information gathering 
by institutions that people distrust. In some cases, there is a trade-off 
between irritating burdens on the one hand and potential invasions of 
privacy on the other. Consider, for example, the question of how much 
information credit-card companies should acquire before offering 
cards to customers. We might welcome situations in which such 
companies can learn what is required and simply send people offers or 
even cards. Whether we should do so depends in part of what 
information they have and whether it might be misused. If government 
has or acquires the relevant information, the risks might be thought 
unacceptable. 
The question of security is closely related. To set up an online 
account, people might be asked to provide, and might be willing to 
provide, sensitive information—involving, for example, their bank 
account or their credit card. Sludge might be designed to ensure against 
security violations. People might have to answer questions about their 
address, their Social Security number, or their mother’s maiden name. 
These questions are not exactly fun, but they might be justified as a 
means of ensuring against some kind of breach. Ideally, of course, we 
would have some clarity about the benefits and costs of obtaining the 
relevant information. But if costs and benefits are difficult to specify, it 
might make sense to have a rough-and-ready sense that a degree of 
not-especially-onerous sludge is desirable to prevent the worst-case 
scenarios.145 
D. Targeting and WTPT 
A growing literature on “hassles” and “ordeals” explores how 
administrative burdens might operate as a rationing device, ensuring 
 
 144.  On some of the relevant tradeoffs, see generally Memorandum from Jeffrey D. Zients, 
Dep. Dir. for Mgmt., & Cass R. Sunstein, Admin., OIRA, to Heads of Executive Departments 
and Agencies (Nov. 3, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/ 
omb/memoranda/2011/m11-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/56QK-7HCR] (encouraging federal agencies 
to share data to improve program implementation while complying with privacy laws). 
 145.  Cf. Stephen M. Gardiner, A Core Precautionary Principle, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 33 (2006) 
(discussing the precautionary principle). 
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that certain goods go to those who most want or need them.146 The 
simple idea is that burdens can improve self-selection. When a movie 
or a concert is immensely popular, people might have to stay on the 
telephone or wait in line for a ridiculously long time. If that can be 
justified, it is because an investment of time, like an expenditure of 
money, helps measure how intensely people want things. In the same 
vein, seemingly onerous administrative burdens might be a reasonable 
way of screening applicants for job training or other programs. If 
people are really willing to run the gauntlet, we might have good reason 
to think that they will benefit from those programs. 
The basic idea here is that it is important to find good ways to 
screen those who seek access to scarce resources. In markets, the 
willingness-to-pay criterion provides the standard screen; it is meant to 
ensure that people will receive goods if and only if they are willing to 
pay for them. Willingness to pay money is one way to measure need or 
desire; willingness to pay in terms of time and effort (“WTPT,” for 
short) is another. It is possible to argue that the willingness-to-pay 
criterion discriminates against people without much money, because 
willingness to pay is dependent on ability to pay. WTPT does not have 
that defect. If anything, it discriminates against people without much 
time.  
There may or may not be a correlation between lacking money 
and lacking time. Government might choose to use WTPT as a way of 
targeting—as a way of ensuring that goods are allocated to people who 
really need and want them. Note also that if people are willing to pay 
others to do a relevant task, such as tax preparation, the difference 
between WTP and WTPT might be erased.147 
 
 146.  Examples include: Albert Nichols & Richard Zeckhauser, Targeting Transfers through 
Restrictions on Recipients, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 372 (1982); Vivi Alatas et al., Ordeal Mechanisms 
in Targeting: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 19121, 2013), https://www.nber.org/papers/ 
w19127.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XFF-QP8E]; Amedeo Fossati & Rosella Levaggi, Public 
Expenditure Determination in a Mixed Market for Health Care (May 4, 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=539382 [https://perma.cc/ 
GF5A-YRY5]; Sarika Gupta, Perils of the Paperwork: The Impact of Information and 
Application Assistance on Welfare Program Take-Up in India (Nov. 15, 2017) (unpublished 
Ph.D. job market paper, Harvard University Kennedy School of Government), 
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/sarikagupta/files/gupta_jmp_11_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4HY-
3YK4].  
 147.  Note that the IRS provides free online tax preparation to 60 percent of taxpayers. IRS’ 
Intent to Enter into an Agreement with Free File Alliance, LLC (i.e., Free File Alliance), 67 Fed. 
Reg. 67,247 (Nov. 4, 2002). The program is available for free to taxpayers with income less than 
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The problem is that sludge is often a singularly crude method of 
targeting. A complex, barely comprehensible form for receiving 
federal aid is not exactly a reliable way to ensure that people who need 
financial help actually get that help. If the goal is to ensure that people 
who are eligible for the EITC actually receive it, a degree of sludge is 
not the best sorting mechanism. Ordeals have their purposes, and 
sludge can be an ordeal. But it is a hazardous mechanism for 
targeting—and actually, it is worse than that. In some cases, ordeals 
work in concert with the limitations faced by poor people, so as 
specifically to select out those with the highest need.148 It is reasonable 
to speculate that this particular problem is pervasive. It highlights a 
central point here. Paperwork burdens should be assessed for their 
distributive effects.149 If they have especially adverse consequences for 
the most disadvantaged members of society, there is a serious problem. 
E. Acquiring Useful Data 
Public officials might impose administrative burdens in order to 
acquire data that can be used for multiple purposes, and that might 
benefit the public a great deal. For example, officials might want to 
know whether people who receive employment training, or some kind 
of educational funding, are actually benefiting from the relevant 
program. What do they do with that training or that funding? 
Administrative burdens might be essential to obtain answers to that 
question. Or suppose that the government is trying to reduce the 
spread of an infectious disease, to promote highway development, to 
monitor hazardous-waste management, to ensure that pilots are 
properly certified and that airplanes are properly maintained, or to see 
how food-safety programs are working.150 Those who receive 
information-collection requests might complain of sludge. But the 
relevant burdens might be justified as a means of ensuring acquisition 
of important or even indispensable knowledge. 
 
$66,000 annually. Internal Revenue Service, About the Free File Program (Nov. 21, 2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/e-file-providers/about-the-free-file-program [https://perma.cc/L5CL-X4ZG]. 
 148.  See Gupta, supra note 146, 30–31. 
 149.  See HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 6–8.  
 150.  Some of these examples are drawn from OIRA’s Information Collection Dashboard. 
Information Collection Review Dashboard, OIRA, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/ 
jsp/PRA/praDashboard.myjsp?agency_cd=0000&agency_nm=All&reviewType=EX&from_pag
e=index.jsp&sub_index=1 [https://perma.cc/8X7M-9RHE]. For those who are interested in 
sludge reduction, or in information collection in general, the Dashboard (typically neglected by 
scholars) is worth careful attention. 
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In some of these cases, of course, such burdens might be an effort 
to ensure program integrity. But I am emphasizing a different point. 
Even if program integrity is already guaranteed, officials might seek 
information, and require people to provide it, in order to provide both 
short-term and long-term benefits. Importantly, that information 
might be made public and used by private and public sectors alike.151 
In the modern era, acquisition of information might promote public 
and private accountability. It might save money. It might spur 
innovation. It might even save lives. 
These are important justifications for sludge, and they are easy to 
overlook. But they should not be taken as a kind of blank check or as 
an open invitation for officials to impose significant administrative 
burdens. For any particular burden, a central question is whether 
government is actually acquiring useful information. If public officials 
are asking people to file with paper rather than electronically, refusing 
to reuse information that they already have, declining to prepopulate 
forms, or requiring quarterly rather than annual reporting, they should 
face a significant burden of justification. In all of these cases, they are 
likely to run into difficulty in meeting that burden. 
In the abstract, it is not possible to say whether sludge can be 
justified as a means of generating useful or important information. 
Some cases will be easy; any such justification will not be credible. 
Other cases will also be easy; any such justification is self-evidently 
convincing. Still other cases will be hard; without investigating the 
details with care, we cannot know whether such a justification is 
sufficient. The only point is that the benefits of sludge might be found 
there. 
V.  SLUDGE REDUCTION AS BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED 
DEREGULATION 
Return to the number with which I began: 9.78 billion. Insofar as 
we are speaking of federal paperwork purposes, that number deserves 
serious attention. It is also important to see that there are significant 
disparities across agencies, and these give a fuller picture than the 
aggregate number:152 
 
 
 151.  See DATA.GOV, where the U.S. government provides a great deal of useful information, 
much of it emerging from information-collection requests.  
 152.  See INFORMATION COLLECTION BUDGET 2016, supra note 10, at 7. 
SUNSTEIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2019  3:59 PM 
1874  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1843 
 
Table 1. FY 2015 Paperwork-Burden Hours by Agency (in millions 
of hours). 
 
Agency Burden Hours 
Department of the Treasury/Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) 7357.22 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 695.88 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 224.89 
Department of Transportation (DOT) 214.21 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 203.39 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 156.89 
Department of Labor (DOL) 144.71 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 135.37 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) 127.55 
Department of Education 90.84 
 
These numbers provide at least a little help in identifying where 
the problem of sludge is most serious and where the greatest 
opportunities for sludge reduction can be found. For example, the 
Department of the Treasury, and the IRS in particular, wins Olympic 
Gold for sludge production. The Department of Education is lowest on 
the list, but 90 million hours of annual paperwork burdens impose 
serious costs on universities, high schools, and students. From the raw 
numbers, of course, we cannot know how much of this burden is 
necessary. Perhaps the Department of Agriculture can and should 
reduce sludge by 20 percent; perhaps the Department of Health and 
Human Services can and should reduce sludge by 10 percent. What can 
be done to know, or to help? 
One of the distinctive features of that question is that it can appeal 
to people who disagree on many political issues. Divisions with respect 
to climate change, tax rates for the wealthy, and immigration are 
generally irrelevant to the question whether to reduce sludge. To be 
sure, we have seen that on some issues, sludge is introduced for 
political reasons, and sometimes these are contentious. But a great deal 
can be done to reduce sludge without getting close to political divisions. 
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A. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, entrusted with 
overseeing the PRA, has significant room to maneuver. In any 
particular period, it could do a lot or a little to reduce sludge. It can be 
relatively lenient with respect to information collection requests, or 
not. Its leadership can give a signal of leniency, or not. Because it 
assesses such requests on an individual basis, it can work in an ad hoc 
manner to reduce the volume of paperwork burdens added each year, 
or not.153 Alternatively, OIRA can work more systematically. With its 
“data call,” announced every six months, it can direct agencies to 
undertake sludge reduction efforts.154 It can issue binding guidance 
documents, which can include ambitious targets for burden 
reduction.155 It can work with other White House offices, and the 
president personally, to produce presidential memoranda or executive 
orders.  
In fact, OIRA has done all of these things. When I was 
Administrator of OIRA in 2012, for example, the Office directed 
agencies to do a great deal to reduce paperwork burdens.156 For 
example, it called for “significant quantified reductions” in burdens, 
with relatively aggressive requirements:  
Agencies that now impose high paperwork burdens [defined to 
include the Department of Treasury, the Department of Health and 
Human Services, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
Department of Transportation, the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of 
Labor, and the Department of Agriculture] should attempt to identify 
at least one initiative, or combination of initiatives, that would 
eliminate two million hours or more in annual burden. All agencies 
should attempt to identify at least one initiative, or combination of 
 
 153.  OIRA provides a public account of information-collection requests under review. The 
account deserves far more attention, academic and otherwise, than it has received to date. See 
Information Collection Review Dashboard, OIRA, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/PRA/ 
praDashboard.myjsp?agency_cd=0000&agency_nm=All&reviewType=RV&from_page=index.j
sp&sub_index=1 [https://perma.cc/PD5L-9BNJ].  
 154.  See, e.g., Memorandum from Neomi Rao (Aug. 6, 2018), supra note 130 (including a 
request that agencies reduce paperwork burdens in a data call); Memorandum from Cass R. 
Sunstein (June 22, 2012), supra note 5 (same). 
 155.  Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Admin., OIRA, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & 
Agencies & Indep. Reg. Agencies (Apr. 7, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/inforeg/PRAPrimer_04072010.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3VW-
ZD8T]. 
 156.  See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein (June 22, 2012), supra note 5. 
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initiatives, that would eliminate at least 50,000 hours in annual 
burden.157  
For the executive branch, the choice among the various 
procedural vehicles matters in various ways. A presidential directive is 
of course the strongest possible statement; if a document comes from 
the president of the United States, agencies know that it must be taken 
seriously. In contrast, a data call is the weakest,158 and a guidance 
document is in the middle. There are also important questions in terms 
of the content of any directions. A data call could take the form of an 
open-ended standard: “take paperwork burdens seriously” or “reduce 
them to the extent feasible.” As in the document quoted above, it could 
specify concrete numbers: “eliminate ten million burden-hours per 
year” or “cut the existing burden by ten percent.”159 A data call could 
specify, and has in the past specified,160 ways to reduce burdens, such 
as: (1) use of short-form options, (2) allowing electronic 
communication, (3) promoting prepopulation, (4) making less frequent 
information collections, or (5) reusing information that the 
government already has.161 These are examples of standard 
formulations, and they can be enforced with different degrees of 
energy. It is also worthwhile to consider novel formulations, which 
could be far more aggressive. 
 
 157.  Id.  
 158.  To illustrate the point, I will violate my ordinary rule against disclosing conversations 
with the president of the United States. In a meeting during President Barack Obama’s first term, 
we discussed various options for directing agencies to follow certain principles and requirements, 
some of them deregulatory. The president decided in favor of a new executive order, which 
became Executive Order 13563. I had floated various supplements and alternatives, including a 
data call that I would issue. At the end of the meeting, I asked the president what, if anything, to 
do with the data call. The president responded, with some combination of pity, mischief, and 
incredulity, “Cass, the American people don’t really care that much about your darned data call.” 
He might have used some expression other than “darned,” but this is a family law journal.  
 159.  For a mixture of approaches, see Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein (June 22, 2012), 
supra note 5. 
 160.  See, e.g., Memorandum from Neomi Rao (Aug. 6, 2018), supra note 130 (suggesting 
means for eliminating paperwork-burden hours); Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein (June 22, 
2012), supra note 5 (same); Memorandum from Neomi Rao, Admin., OIRA, to Chief Info. Offs. 
(July 21, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/MEMORANDUM-
FOR-CHIEF-INFORMATION-OFFICERS.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PD4-25N7] (same).  
 161.  Memorandum from Neomi Rao (Aug. 6, 2018), supra note 130; see also Memorandum 
from Howard Shelanski, Admin., OIRA, and John P. Holdren, Dir., Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol’y, to 
the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies and of the Indep. Reg. Agencies (Sept. 15, 2015) 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/memos/2015/behavioral-
science-insights-and-federal-forms.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8MX-9K6C] (recommending the use 
of behavioral sciences when crafting initiatives to reduce paperwork-burden hours). 
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If we keep the 9.78-billion-hour figure in mind, we might be able 
to agree that OIRA should undertake an unprecedently bold effort to 
reduce paperwork burdens, with an emphasis on both the flow of new 
burdens and the existing stock. For purposes of illustration: with a 
presidential directive (preferably) or a directive from OIRA itself (also 
good), it could announce an initiative that would require, in the next 
six months: 
• Identification of at least three steps to cut existing burdens 
through the methods of burden reduction enumerated above. 
• A reduction of existing burdens by least 100,000 hours by all 
agencies that impose significant burdens (by some standardized 
definition), and a reduction of at least 3 million hours by the 
agencies that currently impose the greatest burdens.162 
• A focus on reducing burdens imposed on vulnerable 
subpopulations, including the elderly, the disabled, and the poor. 
• A focus on reducing burdens in cases in which those burdens 
compromise specified policy priorities, of special interest to the 
current administration. (These could of course differ across 
administrations and within administrations over time.)  
An initiative of this kind could be specified in many different ways. 
Interactions between OIRA and relevant agencies could undoubtedly 
produce fresh ideas. With respect to policy priorities, different 
administrations would make different choices. Some administrations 
might want to reduce information-collection burdens under the 
Affordable Care Act; others might emphasize sludge imposed on small 
businesses and startups; others might emphasize burdens imposed on 
the transportation sector or on educational institutions; others might 
do all of these. Importantly, many administrative burdens are imposed 
by state and local governments. While OIRA has no direct authority 
over them, it might use its convening power to remove sludge, 
especially where federal, state, and local governments must 
coordinate.163 
 
 162.  See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein (June 22, 2012), supra note 5 (recommending 
a reduction of two million burden hours for those agencies imposing the highest burden and a 
reduction of fifty thousand burden hours for all other agencies).   
 163.  See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY OFF. OF ECON. POL’Y, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, 
DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR  
POLICYMAKERS (July 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/ 
licensing_report_final_nonembargo.pdf [https://perma.cc/67Z3-26CV] (demonstrating the power 
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B. Courts 
There is a lurking question in the background. If the federal 
government imposes a paperwork burden in violation of the PRA, is 
there a legal remedy? Suppose, for example, that the Department of 
Health and Human Services requires hospitals to fill out a host of 
confusing or difficult forms. Suppose, too, that the burden is plainly 
inconsistent with the PRA, in the sense that it has not been minimized 
and has little practical utility. Can hospitals invoke the PRA and seek 
invalidation of the requirement? 
The answer appears to be negative. The general rule is that so long 
as OIRA has approved an information-collection request, people have 
to comply with it.164 As the Court of Claims put it, the PRA creates 
only “the right of a private citizen not to expend time, effort or financial 
resources to respond to an information collection request that has not 
been approved by OMB.”165 This holding, followed by many courts,166 
is supported by the relevant provision of the PRA, which says: 
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be 
subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of 
information that is subject to this subchapter if— 
(1) the collection of information does not display a valid control 
number assigned by the Director in accordance with this subchapter; 
or 
(2) the agency fails to inform the person who is to respond to 
the collection of information that such person is not required to 
respond to the collection of information unless it displays a valid 
control number. 
(b) The protection provided by this section may be raised in the form 
of a complete defense, bar, or otherwise at any time during the agency 
administrative process or judicial action applicable thereto.167 
 
of the federal government to convene state and local government officials and recommending 
elimination of other forms of sludge).  
 164.  See Pac. Nat. Cellular v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 20, 29 (1998). 
 165.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 166.  Id.; see also Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 744 F.3d 741, 750 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(explaining that the PRA merely provides a defense, not a private cause of action, to those of 
whom information is improperly requested); Smith v. United States, 2008 WL 5069783 at *1 (5th 
Cir. 2008) (same); Springer v. IRS, 2007 WL 1252475 at *4 (10th Cir. 2007) (same); Sutton v. 
Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 844 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); Alegent Health-
Immanuel Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 34 F. Supp. 3d 160, 170 (D.D.C. 2014) (same).   
 167.  44 U.S.C. § 3512(b) (2012) (emphasis added).   
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The clear language suggests that the PRA requires only that an 
information collection have and display a control number, which shows 
that it has been approved by OIRA. There is a good argument that the 
PRA should be amended to allow private persons to object more 
broadly, perhaps on the ground that OIRA approval was arbitrary or 
capricious, given the text of the PRA, at least in cases in which the 
information collection is mandatory and in which it exceeds a certain 
threshold. The Administrative Procedure Act generally allows judicial 
review of arbitrary or capricious decisions by public officials.168 That 
standard should be applied to information collections as well, given 
their serious cost and intrusiveness.  
C. Congress 
Should the PRA be amended in other ways? OIRA has 
historically been skeptical of the idea, on the ground that even if one 
or another amendment would be a good idea, putting the statute in play 
in Congress would open the door for other amendments, which may be 
uninformed or counterproductive. Nonetheless, some proposals 
deserve serious consideration.169 It would make sense for relevant 
committees in both the House and the Senate to hold hearings on the 
topic. In particular, three reforms would do a great deal to improve the 
current situation. 
First, Congress should require a periodic “lookback” at existing 
paperwork burdens to see if the current “stock” of requirements can 
be justified and to eliminate those that seem outmoded, pointless, or 
too costly. This reform would build on existing lookback requirements 
for regulation in general.170 With respect to paperwork burdens, the 
lookback could occur every two years, alongside a requirement of a 
publicly available report to Congress. That report could be combined 
with the currently required ICB.171 
Second, Congress should explicitly require agencies to choose the 
least burdensome method for achieving their goals. This is essentially 
a requirement of cost-effectiveness. If, for example, annual reporting 
 
 168.  42 U.S.C. § 706. 
 169.  See Stuart Shapiro, The Paperwork Reduction Act: Benefits, Costs and Directions for 
Reform, 30 GOV’T INFO. Q. 204, 208–09 (2013) (proposing reforms to the PRA to focus on review 
of information requests requiring public participation). 
 170.  See Cass R. Sunstein, The Regulatory Lookback, 94 B.U. L. REV. 579, 592–96 (2014)  
 171.  See Information Collection Budget of the United States Government, 
WHITEHOUSE.GOV, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-regulatory-affairs/reports/ 
#ICB [https://perma.cc/SJZ9-PRP9]. 
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would be as effective as quarterly reporting, then agencies should 
choose annual reporting. As we have seen, current law can be 
understood to require cost-effectiveness, but an explicit legislative 
signal would do considerable good.  
Third, Congress should explicitly require the benefits of 
paperwork to justify the costs. As we have seen, cost-benefit balancing 
can also be seen as required by the PRA in its current form. But the 
statute is hardly clear on that point, and again, Congress should give an 
explicit signal to this effect. 
With respect to paperwork, as with regulation in general, it is 
important to appreciate the difference between cost-effectiveness and 
cost-benefit analysis.172 The former requires the least costly way of 
achieving a specified goal. For that reason, cost-effectiveness is a 
modest idea, and it should not be contentious. Who would support a 
relatively costly way of achieving a particular goal?173 A burden might 
be cost-effective but nonetheless fail cost-benefit analysis—and 
therefore be a bad idea. In general, it is important to say that even if a 
burden is cost-effective, it should also be assessed in cost-benefit terms 
to ensure that it is worthwhile on balance.174 
It is true and important that cost-benefit balancing is not always 
simple for paperwork burdens. When agencies engage in such 
balancing, the general goal is to compare the social benefits and the 
social costs, understood in economic terms.175 A paperwork burden 
may or may not generate social benefits, understood in those terms. 
When the IRS imposes paperwork burdens on taxpayers, it might be 
trying to ensure that they do what the law requires. We can speak of 
economic costs (in terms, perhaps, of monetized hours)176 and of 
 
 172.  For a clear account, see STEPHANIE RIEGG CELLINI & JAMES EDWIN KEE, Cost-
Effectiveness and Cost-Benefit Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL PROGRAM EVALUATION 
636 (Kathryn E. Newcomer, Harry P. Hatry & Joseph S. Wholey eds., 4th ed. 2015). 
 173.  It is true, however, that paperwork burdens can be seen as a kind of tax, and for some 
purposes, a tax should be increased. Consider paperwork burdens imposed on tobacco companies, 
as part of a regime of regulation. It is not obviously unreasonable to think that although cost 
minimization is generally a good idea, it is not necessarily a good idea if it reduces the equivalent 
of a tax imposed on harm-creating activity. Perhaps OIRA should not work especially hard to 
minimize paperwork burdens imposed on cigarette companies. This point is not meant to offer a 
final conclusion but simply to flag the issue. 
 174.  For an attempt to justify this proposition, but with many qualifications, see generally 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION (2018). 
 175.  See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Circular A-4, 
Regulatory Analysis (Sept. 17, 2003) https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/NCK2-VR9G].  
 176.  See Samaha, supra note 15, at 302.  
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economic benefits (in terms, perhaps, of dollars gained by the 
Treasury).177 But that is not standard cost-benefit analysis. Or 
paperwork might be designed to ensure that people applying for 
benefits actually deserve those benefits, as, for example, when the 
effort is to avoid giving transfers to people who are not entitled to 
them.  
In such cases, a crude approach would be to understand the cost-
benefit justification not as an effort to compare social costs and social 
benefits, understood in economic terms, but instead as entailing an 
assessment of proportionality. Are significant costs likely to serve 
significant purposes? What is the magnitude of the costs,178 and what is 
the magnitude of the gains? Real numbers would help inform decisions 
and combat excessive burdens. It is worth emphasizing the fact that 
even a crude form of cost-benefit analysis would be information 
forcing. It would create a stronger incentive for agencies to offer 
accurate accounts of the number of burden hours,179 and also to turn 
them into monetary equivalents. It would simultaneously create an 
incentive for agencies to be more specific, and more quantitative, about 
the expected benefits of information collections.  
We need far more information about the benefits of collecting 
information; in that regard, a requirement of cost-benefit balancing 
should help. It should also help to spur improved and perhaps creative 
ways to test whether the benefits of information collections justify the 
costs.180  
D. Sludge Audits 
An advantage of the ICB is that it can be seen as a kind of national 
Sludge Audit. Covering the entire federal government, it collects 
agency-by-agency burdens and aggregates them. It is also highly 
visible. 
For the moment, let us put its various limitations to one side. Many 
institutions should be conducting Sludge Audits. State and local 
governments should certainly be doing so. The same is true of a wide 
 
 177.  For relevant discussion, see generally David Weisbach, Daniel J Hemel & Jennifer Nou, 
The Marginal Revenue Rule in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 160 TAX NOTES 1507 (2018). 
 178.  On the importance of testing, see Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein (Aug. 9, 2012), 
supra note 5. 
 179.  Id.  
 180.  Weisbach et al., supra note 177, seems to me an important advance, and in some ways it 
is quite generalizable. 
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assortment of nations in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas. 
Transparency about sludge would be the first step toward reducing it. 
One of the advantages of Sludge Audits would be to impose a kind of 
reality check, increasing the likelihood that burden estimates will not 
be unduly optimistic. 
My focus here has been on public institutions, but I have noted 
that a great deal of sludge comes from private institutions, for better or 
for worse.181 Such institutions should be conducting Sludge Audits of 
their own. Banks, insurance companies, hospitals, and publishers could 
save a great deal of money by reducing sludge, and they could improve 
the experience of people who interact with them. It is worth 
underscoring the case of hospitals, where sludge can not only create 
immense frustration but also impair health and even cost lives.182 
CONCLUSION 
The idea of deregulation is usually understood as the removal of 
formal regulations—those governing the environment, food safety, and 
motor vehicles, for example. But administrative burdens are regulatory 
in their own way, and they impose a kind of tax. If they require nearly 
10 billion hours of paperwork annually, they are imposing, at a 
minimum, a cost equivalent to about $200 billion. For both rational 
actors and those who display behavioral biases (such as inertia and 
present bias), administrative burdens can impose excessive costs, 
frustrate enjoyment of rights, and prevent access to important benefits 
of multiple sorts. The $200 billion figure greatly understates the actual 
impact, economic and psychological. Sludge infringes on the most 
fundamental rights; it can also cost lives. 
In these circumstances, there is a strong argument for a 
behaviorally informed deregulatory effort, aimed particularly at 
paperwork burdens. Such an effort would call for reductions at the 
level of program design, including radical simplification of existing 
requirements and (even better) use of default options to cut learning 
and compliance costs. Automatic enrollment can drive administrative 
burdens down to zero and have very large effects for that reason. 
Where automatic enrollment is not possible, officials might use an 
assortment of tools: frequent reminders; simplification and plain 
 
 181.  On worse, see AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 25.  
 182.  For an illustration, see id.  
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language; online, telephone, or in-person help; and welcoming 
messages to reduce psychological costs.183  
What is necessary is a heavily empirical approach to 
administrative burdens, including an effort to weigh their benefits 
against their costs and a careful assessment of their distributional 
effects.184 Are they really helping to reduce fraud? By how much? What 
are the take-up rates, and how do they vary across populations, 
including the most vulnerable? What are the compliance costs, in terms 
of time and money? 
To be sure, the answers to these questions will not always be self-
evident. If sludge discourages exercise of the abortion right, people will 
disagree about whether that is a benefit or a cost. To know whether 
sludge causes losses or gains, we will sometimes run into intense 
disagreements about values. But in many cases, such disagreements are 
uninteresting and irrelevant, and acquisition of the relevant 
information will demonstrate that sludge is not worth the candle. In the 
future, it should be a high priority for deregulation and deregulators, 
for one simple reason: its benefits cannot possibly justify its costs.  
Time is the most precious commodity that human beings have. 
Public officials should find ways to give them more of it. 
 
 
 183.  See HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, for a valuable discussion. 
 184.  See id.  
